As the title indicates, I would like to consider two questions:
What are numbers?
&
Whose camp are we in after all?
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Certainly this sounds like a strange and rather obtuse set of concerns. Particularly the second question. Well, when I ask "whose camp are we in after all?" I m refering to the Platonic/Aristotelian divide or contreversy over what numbers are, and the corresponding role they have within a philosophical metaphysic. But in order to answer this second question, we need to start with the first: what are numbers?
First Plato's position, then we'll move to Aristotle's critique of Plato.
[to be continued...]
20050405
20050404
enviornmental ethics
I have spoken of my interest in enviornmental ethics. Up to this point I have conceived of the term "enviornmental" in a rather crude assumptive way. I have, further, only focused on the analysis of ethics, as if that were the primary problem. Perhaps it is not. Perhaps the primary philosophical interest is rather rooted in the "enviornment". And perhaps it is possible to show that the orientation of any ethics, if it is to be ecologically proper and sound, must first find its footing in what we mean by the term "enviornment."
Consider Heidegger's definition or use for the term...
...furthermore, conceive of enviornment as the world around; dis-associate this term from its ecological association, though this is important, it is not helpful in isolating the fundamental orientation of what we mean by "enviornment". Amd by the term "world" I simply mean the region of existing things we call real. So that one's enviornment is something like that region of existing real things one finds around them. (One thing to note concerning this last sentence: I am assuming something like a subject-object split in the use of my term "around". But I wish to qualify this such that I am by no means trying to link the notion of "around" with the duality of cognition/things in and of themselves. rather, I want to explore the phenomenological orientation of the world "around". I am, as it were, surrounded by phenomena, which I intentionally organize. These phenomena are around me in such a way that they actually make my cognition possible. Without this surrounding of experiential phenomena [which I move about with and in] I could not concieve of my cognition at all. Thus, the duality between cognition/things in and of themselves is really just an after-the-fact distinction I ca make about reality, it is not a substantial structure of the real world itself; or, at least, I have no way to ground my positing of such a thing.)
Thus construed, an enviornmental ethic is something like a statement about where an ethics applies. It is not the subject of the ethical theory - but the region for an ethical theory.
Consider Heidegger's definition or use for the term...
...furthermore, conceive of enviornment as the world around; dis-associate this term from its ecological association, though this is important, it is not helpful in isolating the fundamental orientation of what we mean by "enviornment". Amd by the term "world" I simply mean the region of existing things we call real. So that one's enviornment is something like that region of existing real things one finds around them. (One thing to note concerning this last sentence: I am assuming something like a subject-object split in the use of my term "around". But I wish to qualify this such that I am by no means trying to link the notion of "around" with the duality of cognition/things in and of themselves. rather, I want to explore the phenomenological orientation of the world "around". I am, as it were, surrounded by phenomena, which I intentionally organize. These phenomena are around me in such a way that they actually make my cognition possible. Without this surrounding of experiential phenomena [which I move about with and in] I could not concieve of my cognition at all. Thus, the duality between cognition/things in and of themselves is really just an after-the-fact distinction I ca make about reality, it is not a substantial structure of the real world itself; or, at least, I have no way to ground my positing of such a thing.)
Thus construed, an enviornmental ethic is something like a statement about where an ethics applies. It is not the subject of the ethical theory - but the region for an ethical theory.
20050403
Considerations - 1
Today I would like to begin anew this web log.
The order of this log is of considerations themselves.
The order of this log is of considerations themselves.
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