I sometimes wonder whether or not you could critique a scientific experiment given a narrative rubric. That is, if we consider the fact that narratives (or stories) are nothing other than ways of explaining our lives in the world, then a scientific discovery is something like a narrative too. Consider the basic scientific experiment procedure: Problem > Hypothesis > Data Collection > Conclusion; then consider the narrative formula: Situation > Foreshadowing > Climax > Conclusion. There is an analogous form between these two strings.
The supposed difference between these two strings consists in the fact that the scientific string requires the elemnts of verification and falsification; whereas the criterion(s) for the narrative string seem to differ. Thatz a good question: what exactly is the criterion for a narrative? The answer to this question will enable us to know what things are not narratives.
The basic reasoning behind this type of thought experiment (between science and narrative) is that I would like to argue that if what we call "science" is a narrative form of reasoning, then we can equally apply a narrative form of critique upon a scientific conclusion. Why do this?
Because a logically coherent critique upon the sciences is required if we are to further grant legitimacy to other forms of reasoning. This has direct implications for the philosophy of psychology.
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Is philosophy a therapy? I think not; it is an activity - and therapy (for me) is a bit too passive.
Okay then, all the best to yall.
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